A general model of oligopoly endogenizing Cournot, Bertrand, Stackelberg, and Allaz-Vila by Breitmoser, Yves
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A general model of oligopoly
endogenizing Cournot, Bertrand,
Stackelberg, and Allaz-Vila
Yves Breitmoser
EUV Frankfurt (Oder)
13. January 2010
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19998/
MPRA Paper No. 19998, posted 14. January 2010 16:12 UTC
A general model of oligopoly endogenizing
Cournot, Bertrand, Stackelberg, and Allaz-Vila
Yves Breitmoser∗
EUV Frankfurt (Oder)
January 13, 2010
Abstract
This paper analyzes a T -stage model of oligopoly where firms build up capacity
and conclude forward sales in stages t < T , and they choose production quantities
in t = T . We consider the case of n firms with asymmetric marginal costs. In the
two-stage game, the set of outcomes is a quasi-hyperrectangle including Cournot,
Allaz-Vila, and all two-stage Stackelberg outcomes. In general, it consists of T −1
such hyperrectangles where the lower bound approaches the Bertrand outcome as
T tends to infinity. In the limit, a range of outcomes stretching from Cournot via
Stackelberg to Bertrand can result in equilibrium, i.e. the mode of competition is
entirely endogenous.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes a T -stage model of oligopoly with the following move structure. In
the first T − 1 stages, firms pre-build capacity and conclude forward contracts. In the
final stage, the firms set quantities. Capacities can still be extended in the final stage,
but only at incremental costs. Eventually, the market clears in Cournot fashion, with
linear inverse demand. The set of equilibrium outcomes is characterized completely for
n-firm oligopolies with asymmetric marginal costs. In the two-stage case, it can be char-
acterized as a hyperrectangle in the space of first-order conditions. It corresponds with a
quasi-hyperrectangle in the space of payoff profiles containing the Cournot outcome, all
two-stage Stackelberg outcomes, and the outcome of Allaz and Vila’s (1993) model of
forward trades. In general, it is the union of T −1 hyperrectangles with a constant upper
bound and a lower bound converging to the Bertrand outcome as T tends to infinity.
Our results show that the mode of competition—Cournot, Bertrand, Stackelberg, or
Allaz-Vila—may be entirely endogenous in oligopoly in the sense that all these modes
are self-sustaining in ex-ante equivalent industries. If firms anticipate Cournot, then they
are best off playing according to Cournot, if firms anticipate Stackelberg (with a given
leader-follower assignment), then Stackelberg results, and so on. The firms’ anticipations
may be given by historical standards.
The analysis generalizes several existing models and results of a literature reaching
back to Saloner (1987). Saloner analyzed a Cournot duopoly with two production peri-
ods and showed that a one-dimensional manifold including Cournot and Stackelberg out-
comes may result in equilibrium. Romano and Yildirim (2005) generalize the result and
label this phenomenon the “endogeneity of Cournot and Stackelberg equilibria.” This
“endogeneity” shows that (i) industries need not converge to Cournot equilibrium and
non-cost-related size differences may be persistent in equilibrium, and (ii) Stackelberg
leadership can be sustained without asynchronous timing and without retaliations against
deviations of followers (i.e. in stationary equilibria of repeated games).1 Pal (1991),
however, showed that Saloner’s result does not continue to hold if production costs are
1Another branch of literature, including e.g. Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), Robson (1990), and van
Damme and Hurkens (1999), studies endogenous timing in duopoly. As Matsumura (1999) shows, en-
dogenous Stackelberg does typically not result if there are more than two firms, and in general, models of
endogenous timing are restrictive in the sense that firms can produce only in one of two or more initially
feasible periods. Romano and Yildirim (2005) discuss this in more detail.
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different between the two periods, i.e. the endogeneity seems degenerate. Aside from
this, there are open questions as to how the endogeneity generalizes from duopoly to
oligopoly, whether it applies if firms choose capacities rather than production quantities
in early periods, and in which circumstances it may comprise other modes of competition
besides Cournot and Stackelberg (e.g. Bertrand and Allaz-Vila), as well.
To address these open questions, our model combines the notion of production tim-
ing analyzed by Saloner (1987) with the notion of sales timing (forward trades) analyzed
by Allaz and Vila (1993). The basic idea is that if input can be bought forward (capacity
pre-building or production timing), then output may also be sold forward (sales timing),
and vice versa. Allaz and Vila consider T -stage games where the firms may sell forward
(some of) their eventual output in stages t < T , they decide how much to produce in stage
t = T , and eventually the market clears in Cournot fashion. In the unique equilibrium,
competition is more intense than in the Cournot model and it converges to Bertrand as T
tends to infinity.2 We extend the Allaz-Vila model by assuming that in all stages where
q′ units of output can be sold forward, it is also possible to buy forward the input factors
to produce some q′′ units of output.
Following Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), Saloner (1987), and many subsequent
studies, we assume that the costs of pre-building capacity are sunk in the short term.
This implies that capacity is either constant or accumulates along the path of play and
relates the present study to the aforementioned studies of two-period Cournot models and
“games of accumulation” (Romano and Yildirim, 2005). The difference to these studies is
that they consider games of quantity accumulation while we consider games of capacity
accumulation. In our model, that is, quantity is entirely flexible until the production
period is reached. We are going to show that the results of Saloner and Pal continue to
hold as “quantity precommitment” gets exchanged with “capacity precommitment,” and
also as oligopolistic interactions of more than two firms are considered.
Our main results are as follows. The one-dimensional manifold observed by Sa-
loner (1987) is an n-dimensional manifold in the n-firm oligopoly with both production
2Independently, Bolle (1993) and Powell (1993) reached similar conclusions for T = 2, and to name a
few subsequent studies, Ferreira (2003) derives a Folk theorem for the case that there is no final trading
period, Mahenc and Salanié (2004) show that forward trades weaken competition if firms compete in prices
(which relates to the fact that price competition exhibits strategic substitutes), and Liski and Montero (2006)
show that forward trades simplify penal strategies and tacit collusion in repeated oligopoly.
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and sales timing. This manifold contains the Cournot outcome, the Allaz-Vila outcome,
and many Stackelberg outcomes, and as T tends to infinity, it additionally contains the
Bertrand outcome. Note, however, that we are not going to derive a Folk theorem. The
diversity of equilibrium outcomes is restricted to different modes of competition, i.e. tacit
collusion cannot be rationalized in this manner and penal strategies are not required to
sustain a particular mode.
Section 2 introduces the model and derives a few preliminary results. Section 3
reviews and extends benchmark models known from the literature. Section 4 derives
the main result in the two-stage model, Section 5 generalizes it to T > 2, and Section 6
concludes. The proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Definition of the two-stage model and basic results
Notation Firms are denoted as i ∈ N = {1, . . . ,n}. In stage 1, they set capacities zi and
forward sales yi. In stage 2, they set quantities xi. The players act simultaneously in
each stage, and the choices made in stage 1 are common knowledge in stage 2. The unit
costs of pre-building capacity are γi > 0. In case a quantity xi > zi is chosen in stage 2,
the pre-built capacity is extended at unit costs ci ≥ γi. There are no costs of production
besides the costs of capacity. The inverse demand function is p(x) = a− b∑i∈N xi. The
market for forward trades is competitive and clears between periods 1 and 2 (i.e. before
the actual quantities (xi) are chosen). Throughout this paper scalar values and functions
are set in italics, e.g. capacities zi, vectors are set in boldface type, e.g. z = (zi)i∈N , sets
of scalars are denoted by capital letters, e.g. Zi 3 zi, and sets of vectors are denoted by
capital letters set in boldface type, e.g. Z =×i∈N Zi.
Definition 2.1 (Game). Strategy profiles are denoted as triples (z,y,x) = (zi,yi,xi)i∈N
where for all i ∈ N: zi ∈ Zi ⊆ R+, yi ∈ Yi ⊆ R+, and xi : Z×Y→ Xi ⊆ R+. In stage 2
(the short term), the forward trades had been concluded and the forward trade price p f is
fixed. The short-term profit of i is, as a function of the x chosen by all players and (z,y),
ΠSi (x|z,y) = (xi− yi) ·
(
a−b∑ j x j
)
+ p f · yi− ci ·max{xi(z,y)− zi,0}− γizi. (1)
Assuming perfect foresight and that profitable arbitrage is impossible in equilibrium,
following Allaz and Vila (1993), the market price for forward trades equates with the
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anticipated market price conditional on the choices of (z,y), i.e.
p f (x|z,y) = a−b · ∑
j∈N
x j(z,y). (2)
Substituting p f in Eq. (1), the stage-1 (long term) profit function of i ∈ N becomes
ΠLi (z,y,x) = xi(z,y)∗ p
(
x|z,y)− ci ·max{xi(z,y)− zi,0}− γizi. (3)
We determine subgame-perfect equilibria (SPEs) in pure strategies.
Stage 2 analysis In stage 2, the choices of (zi) and (yi) are fixed, and the quantities (yi)
had been sold at the forward trade price p f . The latter is therefore fixed in stage 2. For
all i∈N, the stage 2 profits ΠSi are continuous and concave in xi, which implies existence
and uniqueness of best-reply functions. Using the indicator Ixi>zi , which evaluates to 1
iff xi > zi, the partial derivatives with respect to xi (for xi 6= zi) can be expressed as
∂ΠSi
∂xi
= a−b∑
j
x j−b(xi− yi)− ci · Ixi>zi,
∂2ΠSi
∂x2i
=−2b. (4)
From this, best reply functions can be derived easily. Mutual best replies, i.e. stage 2
equilibria, solve a corresponding equation system, and existence of stage 2 equilibria
follows from Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. The best replies are only piecewise linear,
however, which implies that uniqueness does not follow from standard arguments. Our
first result establishes uniqueness of stage 2 equilibria for all (z,y), and it provides an
implicit characterization of the stage 2 choices (x∗i ) that is used further below. A simple
closed-form characterization does not seem to be available.
Lemma 2.2. Fix any profile (z,y). The equilibrium quantities x∗i (z,y) are unique for all
i ∈ N and satisfy, using ri = a−b
(
2zi− yi+ x∗−i
)
and x∗−i = ∑ j 6=i x∗j ,
x∗i (z,y) =

zi+ ri2b , if ri < 0
zi, if 0≤ ri ≤ ci
zi+ ri−ci2b , if ri > ci.
(5)
The characterization of the stage 2 equilibrium rests on a profile of values denoted
by (ri) ∈ RN that can be interpreted as follows. Firm i’s revenue in stage 2 is
RSi = (xi− yi) ·
(
a−b∑ j x j
)
+ p f · yi, (6)
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and ri is i’s marginal revenue in stage 2 at xi = zi (in response to the opponents’ equilib-
rium quantities). We may distinguish three cases. Firm i does not exploit the pre-built
capacity (xi < zi) if ri < 0, it just does so (xi = zi) if ri ∈ [0,ci], and it extends capacity
(xi > zi) if ri > ci. In turn, firm i equates marginal revenue with marginal costs only if
ri /∈ (0,ci). At xi = zi, i.e. at the soft capacity constraint, the cost function is not differen-
tiable, and the marginal revenue may assume any value in ri ∈ [0,ci] in equilibrium.
The comparative statics of the stage 2 equilibrium are as follows. Varying the ca-
pacity zi of firm i, we observe a capacity effect—a tendency to exactly use the pre-built
capacity. In essence, this is a commitment effect due to having pre-built capacity. We
have seen above that the choice xi = zi maximizes stage 2 payoffs whenever the marginal
revenue ri is in the interval [0,ci]. Now assume that ri is in the interior of [0,ci]. Small
increments of zi toward z′i in stage 1 reduce ri in stage 2, but as ri remains positive, the
quantity xi will be chosen in stage 2 such that xi = z′i. Similarly, small decrements of zi
induce decrements of xi. Hence the tendency to match the pre-built capacity. Varying the
amount of forward trades yi by firm i, we observe a forward trade effect (as described
by Allaz and Vila, 1993). This is a commitment effect due to the possibility of forward
trading. As yi increases, the quantity that is left to be sold in stage 2 shrinks and hence the
marginal revenue ri increases. This induces a tendency to increase production in stage 2.
In relation to the Cournot solution, the forward trade effect tends to induce supra-Cournot
quantities.
Exploitation of pre-built capacities Let MRSi = ∂R
S
i /∂xi denote i’s short-term marginal
revenue, and let MRLi = ∂RLi /∂zi denote i’s long-term marginal revenue. They can be de-
fined as
MRSi = a−b∑
j
x j−b(xi− yi) MRLi = a−b∑
j
x j−bxi. (7)
The difference between MRSi and MR
L
i is the forward trade effect. It implies MR
S
i ≥MRLi
in general and MRSi > MR
L
i if yi > 0. If yi is large enough, then MR
L ≤ γi and MRS > ci
may hold true simultaneously. In this case, firm i would be best off delaying capacity
investments until stage 2. The next result shows that capacity investments are never
delayed in equilibrium (if ci > γi), and it also shows that firms do not build up excess
capacity in equilibrium. That is, firms exactly exploit their pre-built capacity along the
path of play in any SPE.
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Lemma 2.3. Fix any SPE (z,y,x). For all i ∈ N, the quantity chosen along the equilib-
rium path satisfies xi(z,y)≥ zi, and in case ci > γi it satisfies xi(z,y) = zi.
The case ci = γi is a little more complex. As the previous result suggests, capacity
may be extended in stage 2 if ci = γi. We will see below (Lemma 4.2), however, that the
set of equilibrium outcomes is unaffected by this effect.
3 Interrelations between simplified two-stage models
The present section describes the range of equilibrium outcomes that result when the
model is restricted in either of its dimensions. We thereby generalize a few results known
from the literature to the case of n firms and asymmetric costs, but the main purpose of
this section is to establish a representation of these outcomes in the space of first-order
conditions. This alternative representation offers a simple (and novel) way to describe
the interrelations between the various models and will be helpful in analyzing the general
model further below.
We begin with the case that pre-built capacity cannot be extended in stage 2 (i.e. ci =
∞ for all i ∈ N). The Cournot outcome results. This result is not novel, but it is stated for
completeness. It shows that a necessary condition for the competition-enhancing effect
of forward trades is that capacity can be extended after output had been sold forward.
The possibility of forward trades does not induce the competition-enhancing effect when
“only” quantity, as opposed to capacity, is variable in the production period.
Proposition 3.1 (Capacity cannot be extended in stage 2). Assume “sufficiently similar”
marginal costs (γi) and ci = ∞ for all i ∈ N. In the unique SPE, the Cournot outcome
results, with the equilibrium price
pC =
a+∑ j∈N γ j
1+n
. (8)
Second consider interactions where capacity cannot be pre-built, i.e. the framework
of Allaz and Vila (1993). The following result generalizes Prop. 2.3 of Allaz and Vila to
asymmetric costs and n players. We find that forward trades induce competitive behavior
in the sense that the Allaz-Vila price is smaller than the Cournot price in general, i.e.
pAV < pC. For our purpose, the closed-form characterization of the price in the n-firm
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framework is more important, however. For notational clarity, ci = γi is used here, since
γi as used before is irrelevant when capacity cannot be pre-built.
Proposition 3.2 (Capacity cannot be pre-built). Assume “sufficiently similar” marginal
costs (γi), ci = γi for all i∈N, and Zi = {0} for all i∈N. In the unique SPE, the Allaz-Vila
outcome results, with equilibrium price
pAV =
a+n∑i∈N γi
1+n2
. (9)
In light of Props. 3.1 and 3.2, let us now look at the common theme underlying these
results. The first-order conditions in the Cournot models are
p−bzi− γi = 0 ∀i ∈ N, (10)
using p = a−b∑ j z j as the respective market price, and in reduced form, the first-order
conditions in the Allaz-Vila model are
p− 1
n
·bzi− γi = 0 ∀i ∈ N. (11)
In general terms, these alternative sets of first-order conditions can be represented as
p−λibzi− γi = 0 ∀i ∈ N (12)
for appropriately chosen (λi) ∈ RN+. The first-order conditions in the Cournot-model are
obtained for λ1 = · · ·= λn = 1, and the Allaz-Vila conditions correspond with λ1 = · · ·=
λn = 1/n. That is, we can represent models, and their respective first-order conditions,
by profiles (λi) ∈ RN+. To grasp the underlying idea, let us show how (λi) relates to
conjectural derivatives. If qi denotes the quantity of i and q−i the aggregate quantity of
i’s opponents, and if players compete by choosing quantities in a market with inverse
demand P(qi+q−i), then i first-order condition is (assuming constant marginal costs γi)
P−qi ·P′(qi+q−i) ·
(
1+ dq−idqi
)
− γi = 0. (13)
In our model, P′(q) = −b applies, and hence we obtain λi = 1+ dq−idqi =
d(q−i+qi)
dqi
. In
words, λi measures how much the aggregate market quantity increases if i increases qi
by a unit. In the Cournot model, the aggregate quantity increases by a unit, too, but in
the Allaz-Vila model, an increase of the amount of forward trades induces an increase
of the own quantity which in turn crowds out the opponents’ quantities. The ratio of the
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increase of the own quantity to the resulting increase of the overall quantity is λi = 1/n
in the Allaz-Vila model.
It is straightforward to verify that in the case of linear demand and constant marginal
costs as assumed above, there is a unique equilibrium price and profit profile associated
with each (λi), i.e. with each set of first-order conditions.
p =
a+∑iλ−1i γi
1+∑iλ−1i
, Πi =
1
λib
·
(
a− γi+∑ j λ−1j (γ j− γi)
1+∑ j λ−1j
)2
. (14)
Hence, it is sufficient to characterize models and their outcomes by the induced profile
(λi) of conjectural derivatives. To further illustrate the resulting interrelations between
models, let us next consider the following class of two-stage Stackelberg games.
Definition 3.3 (Two-stage Stackelberg games). For any partition (N1,N2) of N, define the
(N1,N2)-Stackelberg game as the two-round extensive form game of perfect information
where all players i ∈ N1 simultaneously move (choosing quantities) in round 1, and all
players j ∈ N2 do so in round 2.
Take a partition (N1,N2) of N, and consider the respective (N1,N2)-Stackelberg
game. It is easy to see (see e.g. Lemma 4.4 below) that the first-order conditions of this
(N1,N2)-Stackelberg game can be characterized as λi = 1/(|N2|+1) for all first-movers
i ∈ N1 and as λ j = 1 for all followers j ∈ N2. That is, Cournot oligopolists have conjec-
tural derivatives (λi = 1) that correspond with those of Stackelberg followers. Allaz-Vila
oligopolists have conjectural derivatives that are equivalent to those of first movers in({i},N \{i})-Stackelberg games where all opponents are followers.
In the last of our benchmark models, forward trades are impossible. The result that
we report relates to the results that Saloner (1987) and Pal (1991) obtain for Cournot
duopolies with two production periods. In essence, the relation of (ci) and (γi) becomes
relevant. Saloner showed that a continuum of outcomes containing the Stackelberg out-
comes and the Cournot outcome may result if c = γ, and Pal showed that this kind of
Cournot-Stackelberg endogeneity disappears as c 6= γ. We distinguish the cases (i) ci > γi
for all i and (ii) ci = γi for all i and show that the same pair of outcomes can be established
if we consider “capacity accumulation” rather than “quantity accumulation.” That is, we
show that Saloner’s result continues to hold when quantity produced in stage 1 can be
withheld from being sold on the market in stage 2. To my knowledge, this remained an
open question ever since it had been raised by Saloner (1987, p. 186 f.).
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Proposition 3.4 (Zero forward trades). Assume “sufficiently similar” marginal costs (γi)
and Yi = {0} for all i ∈ N.
1. If ci > γi for all i ∈ N, then the Cournot outcome results in the unique SPE.
2. If ci = γi for all i∈N, then an outcome 〈p,(Πi)〉 can result if and only if there exists
a partition (N1,N2) of N such that 〈p,(Πi)〉 satisfies Eq. (14) for some (λi) where
λi ∈
[
1
|N2|+1 ,1
]
for all i ∈ N1 and λ j = 1 for all j = N2.
Prop. 3.4 also shows how the Cournot-Stackelberg endogeneity generalizes from
duopoly to oligopoly. In oligopoly, the set of equilibrium outcomes is a continuum con-
taining the outcomes of all two-stage Stackelberg games (see Def. 3.3) and the Cournot
outcome. The set is not convex in the payoff space, but it is the union of finitely many hy-
perrectangles in (λi)-space. Namely, it is the union, over all (N1,N2)-Stackelberg games,
of the hyperrectangles containing the respective (N1,N2)-Stackelberg outcome and the
Cournot outcome. For example, in three-player games, the set of outcomes is the union
of six hyperrectangles (as there are six two-stage Stackelberg games between three play-
ers), where each hyperrectangle has a Stackelberg solution and the Cournot solution at
its corner points.
Briefly, let us illustrate why a continuum of outcomes exists in case c = γ. Focus on
the case of two players and consider the outcome associated with some (λ1,λ2) where
λ1 ∈ [1/2,1) and λ2 = 1. In this case, 1/2≤ λ1 < 1 implies that firm 1 chooses a capacity
somewhere between that of a Stackelberg leader and that of a Cournot duopolist, and
λ2 = 1 implies that 2 plays the best response. In a pure Cournot framework, firm 1 would
benefit by decreasing his quantity, but in the two-stage game considered here, firm 2
would respond by increasing the capacity in stage 2 in case c2 = γ2. Hence, decreasing
capacity pays off for firm 1 only if it does so for a Stackelberg leader. The latter, however,
cannot be the case if Eq. (12) holds true for λ1 ≥ 1/2. In turn, player 1 does not benefit
from increasing capacity when Eq. (12) is satisfied for some λ1 ≤ 1. For, firm 2 does not
respond to a capacity increase of 1 by decreasing his quantity in stage 2 as long as λ2 > 0
(i.e. as long as i’s marginal revenue is positive). To summarize: 1’s incentives correspond
with those of a Cournot duopolist with respect to capacity increases and with those of
Stackelberg followers with respect to capacity decreases. Hence, λ1 may attain any value
in [1/2,1] in equilibrium.
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Figure 1: Range of profit profiles that may result in equilibrium (two players, zero costs)
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4 Analysis of two-stage games
To summarize the above benchmark results, the Cournot-Stackelberg endogeneity holds
equally in both, games of quantity accumulation and games of capacity accumulation,
but it seems to be degenerate in that ci = γi for all i ∈ N is a necessary condition, and it
connects all two-stage Stackelberg games with Cournot competition. The present section
considers the general two-stage interaction with both production timing and sales tim-
ing, i.e. with both capacity accumulation and forward trades. Initially we focus on the
“generic” case ci > γi for all i, the extension toward ci = γi for all i is covered below. The
result is provided first.
Proposition 4.1. Assume ci > γi for all i ∈ N, the (ci) are sufficiently close to (γi), and
the (γi) are sufficiently similar. A price p ∈ R and a payoff profile Π ∈ RN can result in
SPE if and only if there exists (λi) ∈
[1
n ,1
]N
such that p and Π satisfy Eq. (14).
The set of equilibrium outcomes is the hyperrectangle, in (λi)-space, with the Cournot
solution (λi = 1 for all i) and the Allaz-Vila solution (λi = 1/n for all i) at its oppo-
site corner points. It contains all two-stage Stackelberg outcomes and many interme-
diate outcomes. Note, however, that the set of equilibrium outcomes is only “quasi-
hyperrectangular” in in the payoff space, i.e. neither convex nor hyperrectangular (see
also Figure 1).
To gain intuition, let us outline the structure of the equilibria constructed in the proof
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(further equilibria exist, but they do not induce alternative outcomes). Fix (λi) ∈
[1
n ,1
]N
and find the unique capacities (zi)i∈N such that
p−λibzi− γi = 0 ∀i ∈ N, (15)
at the respective market price p = a−b∑i zi. See e.g. Eq. (39). Set (yi)i∈N such that
p−b(zi− yi)− ci = 0 ∀i ∈ N. (16)
Since λi > 0, this is possible even if ci > γi.3 All such strategy profiles (z,y) can be
extended to SPEs by choosing appropriate (xi). By Lemma 2.2, the respective (xi) are
unique in all subgames, and by Lemma 2.3, xi = zi results along the path of play for
all i ∈ N. Eq. (16) implies that the stage 2 marginal revenue satisfies ri = ci for all
i ∈ N. When any i ∈ N deviates unilaterally by increasing zi in stage 1, then he will be
best off exploiting the extended capacity in stage 2 (his marginal revenue falls below ci
but remains positive). Anticipating this quantity increase after observing the capacity
“increase” of i, the opponents’ marginal revenues fall below marginal costs c j, but they
remain positive, too. Hence, the opponents’ quantities are constant in response to i’s
capacity increase, and hence, i’s capacity increase pays off if and only if it would pay off
for a Cournot oligopolist. The latter applies iff
p−bzi− γi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N. (17)
Alternatively, i may cut capacity. The most profitable capacity cut implies that i simul-
taneously adjusts yi so that he will not be best off extending capacity in stage 2 again.
Regardless of yi, however, the opponents’ marginal revenues in stage 2 rise above c j due
to the capacity cut (i.e. due to correctly anticipating the quantity cut that follows), and
hence they all respond by extending their capacities in stage 2. In turn, capacity cuts pay
off if and only if a quantity cut pays for a Stackelberg leader to which all n−1 opponents
respond by acting simultaneously. This applies iff
p− 1
n
bzi− γi ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ N. (18)
3To be precise, it is possible whenever ci ≤ pAV for all i ∈ N. Eq. (16) cannot be satisfied if ci > p.
Assuming ci = c for all i, pAV ≤ c ≤ pC implies that the equilibrium price range is the interval
[
c, pC
]
.
If c > pC, short-term capacity extensions become prohibitive in the sense of Prop. 3.1, and the Cournot
outcome results in the unique SPE.
12
Since Eq. (15) is satisfied for some λi ∈
[
1/n,1
]
, neither Eq. (17) and Eq. (18) can be
satisfied, i.e. neither capacity cuts nor capacity extensions pay off if λi ∈
[
1/n,1
]
.
The next result establishes that Prop. 4.1 extends to the degenerate case ci = γi for
all i ∈ N.
Lemma 4.2. Assume (γi) are sufficiently similar. The set outcomes that can be sustained
in equilibrium is upper hemicontinuous in (ci) if ci ≥ γi for all i ∈ N.
The next pair of results explores the relation of the equilibrium set to that of general
Stackelberg games. The first of these results derives the representation of the equilibrium
outcomes of general Stackelberg games in the (λi)-space. For notational simplicity, we
assume identical marginal costs (γi) in the following.
Definition 4.3 (Stackelberg games). For any partition (Nt)t≤T = (N1,N2, . . . ,NT ) of N,
define the (Nt)t≤T -Stackelberg game as the T -round extensive form game of perfect in-
formation where the players i ∈ Nt simultaneously move (choosing quantities) in round
t, for all t = 1, . . . ,T .
Lemma 4.4. Assume γi = γ j for all i, j ∈ N. The equilibrium profits of the players in any
(Nt)t≤T -Stackelberg game are given by Eq. (14) using λi =∏Tt ′=t+1
1
|Nt′ |+1 for all i ∈ Nt
and all t ≤ T . The respective equilibrium price, quantities, and profits correspond with
an equilibrium according to Prop. 4.1 if and only if ∏Tt=2
1
|Nt |+1 ≥
1
n .
In the eyes of the first mover, the most “desirable” move sequence is that all op-
ponents follow by moving simultaneously. This is a two-stage Stackelberg game, and
as indicated before, it is associated with (λi) where λ1 = 1/n and λi = 1 for all i > 1.
Since λi ≥ 1/n for all i applies in this game, this Stackelberg game corresponds with an
equilibrium of the general game in Prop. 4.1. As Lemma 4.4 shows, the equilibria of
many other Stackelberg games coincide with equilibria of the present model. This does
not apply for the equilibria of all Stackelberg games, however. For example, consider the
Stackelberg game where n = 3 players move strictly sequential (player 1 moves first, 2
moves second, 3 moves third). By Lemma 4.4, its equilibrium is characterized as λ1 = 14 ,
λ2 = 12 , and λ3 = 1, which violates λi ≥ 1n for all i. Then again, its outcome is weakly
Pareto dominated by the Cournot outcome, and it is strictly Pareto dominated by other
equilibrium outcomes compatible with Prop. 4.1. The following result establishes that
equilibria of Stackelberg outcomes are either compatible with the general game covered
by Prop. 4.1 or they are Pareto dominated by an outcome compatible with Prop. 4.1.
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Lemma 4.5. Assume γi = γ j for all i, j ∈ N. Not all equilibrium outcomes of general
(Nt)t≤T -Stackelberg games correspond with equilibrium outcomes according to Prop.
4.1. All those that do not are Pareto dominated by some equilibrium outcome compatible
with Prop. 4.1, however.
5 Analysis of the general T -stage game
Allaz and Vila (1993) and Romano and Yildirim (2005) motivate and analyze the T -
round games of forward trading and accumulation, respectively. Their analyses provide
an interesting pair of baseline results. Allaz and Vila (1993) show that the forward trade
effect becomes more intense and the (unique) equilibrium price converges to the Bertrand
price as T approaches infinity in the forward trading game. Romano and Yildirim (2005),
in turn, show that solutions of accumulation games are invariant with respect to T , i.e.
the set of equilibrium outcomes is independent of the number of accumulation periods T .
In order to analyze the aggregate effect, the notation has to be extended slightly.
To keep it as simple as possible, we focus on Markov perfect equilibria (MPEs): the
players’ strategies depend on the cumulative amounts of pre-built capacity and forward
trades, and on the current round index t ≤ T , but they do not depend on the actual move
sequence detailing how the cumulative amounts have been reached. By definition, all
MPEs are also SPEs, and thus the set of outcomes that can result in SPEs includes at
least the outcomes derived below. The set of “states” in this context is denoted by T ×H
with T = {1, . . . ,T} and H = Z×Y. Given any state (t,h), the accumulated capacity is
denoted as zi(h), and following Romano and Yildirim (2005) we assume prior capacity
investments are sunk. The capacity choices are therefore strategies satisfying
zi : T ×H→ Zi s.t. zi(t,h)≥ zi(h) ∀(t,h). (19)
Similarly, the accumulated amount of forward trades is denoted as yi(h) for i ∈ N, and
following Allaz and Vila (1993), forward trades are cumulative, too.
yi : T ×H→ Yi s.t. yi(t,h)≥ yi(h) ∀(t,h) (20)
Finally, the quantity choice has to match the forward trades.
xi : H→ R s.t. xi(h)≥ yi(h) ∀h (21)
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Strategies are tuples (zi,yi,xi) for all i ∈ N. The T -period game is denoted as Γ(T ).
Two additional assumptions are made. First, identical marginal costs γ1 = · · · = γn, as
we will observe (similarly to Allaz and Vila) a convergence toward competitive pricing,
and competitive pricing is not well-defined in the case of heterogenous marginal costs.
Second, ci = γi for all i ∈ N is assumed for simplicity (otherwise, slight restrictions are
imposed on the set of equilibria).
Our first result relates to the T -invariance derived by Romano and Yildirim (2005).
Namely, the set of outcomes that may result in equilibria of Γ(T ) is a subset of the
outcomes that may result in equilibria of Γ(T +1), and hence of Γ(T + l) for all l ≥ 1.
Lemma 5.1. For all T ≥ 1 and any payoff profileΠ∈RN that results in an MPE of Γ(T ),
there exists an MPE of Γ(T +1) that results in the same payoff profile.
Hence, the reasoning underlying the time invariance in games of accumulation re-
mains intact in games of capacity accumulation. To gain intuition, consider an MPE of
Γ(T ). At the end of round T , all firms have concluded their planning phase, i.e. their
plans (forward trades and pre-built capacities) are mutual best responses. We can now
construct a strategy profile of Γ(T + 1) that replicates the moves in all rounds t ≤ T of
the considered MPE, and loosely speaking everything is held constant in round T +1. It
can be shown that by the mutual optimality of the plans in Γ(T ), the players may not gain
by deviating unilaterally in round T +1 of Γ(T +1), and based on this, we can construct
a strategy profile that is an MPE of Γ(T +1).
However, while the players are best off not to deviate unilaterally from an equilib-
rium of Γ(T ) in round T + 1, they may well be best off deviating from the Γ(T )-plans
in Γ(T + 1) if all opponents are doing so. That is, either all firms effectively conclude
their planning phase after round T or they do so after round T +1. Our last result Prop.
5.2 shows that this implies that all equilibria of Γ(T ) can be characterized by an integer
T ∗ ≤ T which denotes the effective duration of the planning phase and a vector (λi) of
implicit conjectural derivatives. By varying T ∗ and (λi), the continuum of equilibrium
outcomes is obtained.
Proposition 5.2. Fix T ≥ 1 and γ = γi = ci for all i ∈ N. The Pareto frontier of the
equilibrium profits in Γ(T ) equates with the one of Prop. 4.1, and as T tends to infinity
the minimal equilibrium price converges to marginal costs γ. Price p and profit profile
Π ∈ RN can result in an MPE of Γ(T ) if and only if there exist T ∗ ≤ T and λ ∈ [1n ,1]N
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Figure 2: Set of equilibrium profit profiles for T ≥ 1 (assuming a = b = 1 and γ= 0)
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where βT ∗ = ∑iλ−1i and for all t ≤ T ∗,
βt = βT
∗
+
[
n+(n−2)βT ∗]T ∗−t∑
τ=1
(n−1)τ−1, (23)
αti =
T ∗
∑
τ=t+1
(1+βτ−2λ−1i )∗ (−1)T
∗−τ+1. (24)
The respective capacities/quantities and amounts of forward trades can be computed
straightforwardly, as a function of 〈T ∗,(λi)〉, as detailed in the proof of Prop. 5.2. A
graphical representation of the set of equilibrium outcomes in a two-player case is pro-
vided in Figure 2. It is rather easy to distinguish the component of the set of equilibrium
outcomes that relates to equilibria where the effective duration of the planning phase is
T ∗ = 1 from the components with duration T ∗ = 2, T ∗ = 3 and so on. The set of equi-
librium outcomes corresponding with any T ∗ ≤ T form a hyperrectangle in (λi)-space,
and the intersection of succeeding hyperrectangles consists of exactly one point (i.e. the
components are not disconnected nor do they overlap).4
4The equilibrium outcome corresponding with T ∗ and λi = 1/n∀i equates with the outcome correspond-
ing with T ∗+1 and λi = 1∀i.
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An simple implication is as follows. In industries where firms participate in forward
markets (for inputs and outputs) for many rounds prior to the production period, the
market price approaches the Bertrand price. If the effective duration of the planning
phase is brief, i.e. if it ends early or starts late, then the market price will be closer to the
Cournot price.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper analyzed a model of oligopoly allowing for sales timing (forward trades)
and production timing (capacity precommitment). We showed that existing results in
games of quantity accumulation apply equivalently in games of capacity accumulation,
generalized both the forward-trade analysis of Allaz and Vila (1993) and the Cournot-
Stackelberg endogeneity (see e.g. Saloner, 1987, Pal, 1991, and Romano and Yildirim,
2005) to n-firm oligopolies, and then showed that the Cournot-Stackelberg endogeneity
is generic in the generalized model considered here. Furthermore, it also covers the
Allaz-Vila outcome and even the Bertrand outcome as T tends to infinity.
We have thus shown that the mode of competition may be entirely independent of
“objective differences” between markets—to the degree that different focal points or his-
torical standards do not constitute objective differences—and that the different modes
are fully self-sustaining in equilibrium in the sense that repeated interaction and complex
penal codes are not required. Conjectural variations with negative conjectural derivatives
rationalized, too, while rationalizable conjectural derivatives of different firms are not
entirely independent of one another and collusive actions are not rationalized.
The assumptions made in this study are fairly standard. For example, linear demand
and constant marginal costs are standard and can be generalized somewhat. The well-
known limitations that Cournot equilibria do not generally exist apply (see e.g. Novshek,
1980). Similarly, the assumption that capacity accumulates, i.e. that capacity investments
represent sunk costs at later stages, is a standard assumption. An issue that deserves
some discussion relates to the point raised by Pal (1996) who argues, in the context of
two-period Cournot games, that asymmetric equilibria seem implausible in symmetric
games. Note that we do not argue that say Stackelberg equilibria necessarily result in
one-shot oligopoly games, but that asymmetric outcomes may be sustained in stationary
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equilibrium points of industries with ex-ante symmetric firms. Such industries may well
have historically established leadership and follower assignments, even if firms do not
move asynchronously, and since the equilibria are self-sustaining, our results show that
such role assignments need not disappear over time even if firm owners or managers tend
to think myopically (low δ, hence no Folk theorem) or tend to act stationarily or forward-
looking (which rules out the possibility of retaliations against firms that deviated from
acting as say followers).
To conclude, let us emphasize that the present study discussed a general framework
of competition, and as such, it does not rationalize everything. That is, it also generates
several falsifiable predictions. As Figure 2 illustrates, the relative profits of different
firms are somewhat correlated in equilibrium (but note that the correlation weakens as the
number of firms grows). Similarly, there is a falsifiable mapping from implicit conjectural
derivatives (= 1−λi as discussed above) into the set of outcomes. An investigation of
these predictions may be a subject of further research.
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A Relegated Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.2 Fix (z,y). For all i ∈ N, define the intervals X ′i = [yi,xi] such that
a−bxi = 0. The best responses are generally unique, continuous in xi ∈ X−i, and for all
xi ∈ X−i the best response of i necessarily satisfies xi ∈ X ′i . Since X ′i is compact, closed,
and convex for all i ∈ N, existence of a pure strategy equilibrium (x∗i )i=1,...,n thus follows
from Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. Eq. (5) represents the necessary conditions for a
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profile of mutual best responses, which therefore have to be satisfied in any equilibrium
x∗. We have to show that the equilibrium is unique. For any equilibrium x there exist sets
N−,N+ ⊆ N, with N−∩N+ = /0, such that
xi < 0 for i ∈ N−, xi = 0 for i /∈ N−∪N+, xi > 0 for i ∈ N+. (25)
Define m and k such that, relabeling the players appropriately, the sets are N−= {1, . . . ,m}
and N+ = {k + 1, . . . ,n}. Thus, and due to Eq. (5), x solves a linear (m+ n− k)–
dimensional equation system with the following unique solution (x1, . . . ,xm,xk+1, . . . ,xn).
x1
.
xm
xk+1
.
xn

=

2s
s+1 . − 2s+1 − 2s+1 . − 2s+1
. . . . . .
− 2s+1 . 2ss+1 − 2s+1 . − 2s+1
− 2s+1 . − 2s+1 2ss+1 . − 2s+1
. . . . . .
− 2s+1 . − 2s+1 − 2s+1 . 2ss+1

×

a+by1
2b
.
a+bym
2b
a−ck+1+byk+1
2b
.
a−cn+byn
2b

(26)
using s :=m+n−k. In turn, for any pair N−,N+, there is (at most) one profile x such that
Eqs. (5) and (25) are satisfied. Hence, the equilibrium is unique if N− and N+ are unique.
Fix any pair N−,N+ such that an equilibrium is induced. First, note that N− contains the
players i with the lowest values of a+byi2b , i.e. the following is true.
i ∈ N− and j /∈ N− ⇒ a+byi
2b
<
a+by j
2b
. (27)
Similarly, it can be shown that N+ contains the players with the largest a−ci+byi2b , i.e.
i ∈ N+ and j /∈ N+ ⇒ a− ci+byi
2b
>
a− c j +by j
2b
. (28)
Thus, for all pairs (k,m) such that m := |N−| and k := n−|N+|, there is a unique solution
xi satisfying Eqs. (5) and (25). Now pick any equilibrium x, and assume that it is not
unique. An equilibrium x′ 6= x exists which is characterized by M−,M+ where
x′i < 0 for i ∈M−, x′i = 0 for i /∈M−∪M+, x′i > 0 for i ∈M+. (29)
Further, define m′ := |M−| and k′ := n− |M+|. If x′ 6= x, then (m′,n′) 6= (m,n) follows
by the previous argument. Without loss of generality, assume m′ > m which implies
M− ⊃ N−. Define ∆xi := x′i− xi for all i. Note that M− ⊃ N− implies ∆xi < 0 for all
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i∈M−. In turn, M− ⊃N− requires that j /∈M− exists such that ∆x j > 0. Hence, j ∈M+,
which implies ∆x j′ > 0 for all j′ ∈M+ and thus M+ ⊇ N+. This can be satisfied only if
x′i =
a+byi
2b
− 1
2∑j 6=i
x′j, xi ≤
a+byi
2b
− 1
2∑j 6=i
x j
for all i ∈ M− (note that the inequality on the right-hand side is an equality iff i ∈ N−,
but not for all i ∈M−), and
x′i =
a− ci+byi
2b
− 1
2∑j 6=i
x′j, xi ≥
a− ci+byi
2b
− 1
2∑j 6=i
x j
for all i ∈M+. Hence, for i ∈M− and j ∈M+, we obtain
xi+
1
2∑k 6=i
xk ≤ x′i+
1
2∑k 6=i
x′k, x j +
1
2 ∑k 6= j
xk ≥ x′j +
1
2 ∑k 6= j
x′k (30)
and
x′j− x j +
1
2
(x′i− xi)≤
1
2 ∑k 6=i, j
(xk− x′k)≤ x′i− xi+
1
2
(x′j− x j). (31)
This is satisfied iff x′j− x j ≤ x′i− xi, which contradicts ∆xi < 0 and ∆x j > 0. Hence, the
equilibrium x is unique.
Proof of Lemma 2.3 Assume an SPE (z,y,x) exists where xi(z,y) 6= zi for some i ∈
N. Then i benefits by deviating unilaterally to z′i = xi(z,y) in stage 1. By Lemma 2.2,
the choices of x(z′i,z−i,y) following this unilateral deviation are unique, and hence the
following quantities, which are mutual best responses, must be played: x j(z′i,z−i,y) =
x j(z,y) for all j 6= i, and x′i(z′i,z−i,y) = z′i. The gain of player i would be −(xi− zi)γi if
xi < 0, or (xi− zi)∗ (ci− γi) if xi > 0. In turn, the initially assumed strategy profile is not
an SPE under the assumptions of the Lemma.
Proof of Proposition 3.1 Fix any SPE (z,y,x), let p denote the corresponding market
price, and define ri := a−b(z−i+2zi− yi) for all i. Eq. (34) must be satisfied again, i.e.
p = b(zi− yi)+ ri for all i ∈ N. Since ci = ∞ for all i ∈ N, xi(z′i,z−i,y) ≤ z′i follows for
all i ∈ N and all z′i. By Lemma 2.3, xi(z,y) = zi holds true in any SPE. Combined, this
shows that a decrease of a capacity zi cannot lead to an increase of the quantity x j for any
j 6= i. As a result, ∂Πi∂zi = p− bzi− γi ≥ 0 must be satisfied for ∂zi < 0, i.e. p ≥ bzi + γi,
which implies ri ≥ γi > 0, for all i ∈ N. By Lemma 2.2, this implies ∂x j∂zi = 0 for all
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j 6= i. As in the proof of Prop. 3.4, ∂Πi∂zi ≤ p−bzi− γi ≤ 0 has to be satisfied for ∂zi > 0,
and thus, Eq. (35) is a necessary and sufficient condition again. The unique solution
is given by the Cournot capacities, and the corresponding price. Hence, any strategy
profile (z,y,x) where z corresponds with the Cournot capacities and x corresponds with
the solution according Lemma 2.2 can be extended to an SPE by any y that satisfies the
trivial condition yi ∈ [0,zi] for all i ∈ N.
Proof of Proposition 3.2 Assume that the (xi) chosen along the path of play represent
an interior solution (this will be confirmed by the actual solution below). Given y, the
first-order conditions for an equilibrium in x are p−b(xi−yi) = ci for all i, which implies
bxi =
1
n+1
(
a+∑ j c j−b∑ j y j
)− ci+byi (32)
for all i ∈ N and p = 1n+1 (a+∑i(ci−byi)). Hence, the optimal forward trade quantities
satisfy the following first-order conditions in equilibrium.
∂Πi
∂yi
= (p− ci)
(
1− 1n+1
)−bxi · 1n+1 = 0 ∀i ∈ N (33)
Given p = a− b∑i xi, this immediately implies that the equilibrium price is unique and
equates with pAV .
Proof of Proposition 3.4 Point 1. By Lemma 2.3, xi(z,y) = 0 for all i ∈ N holds true
along the path of play in any SPE. Thus, p = a−b∑i xi = a−b∑i zi and ri = a−b(z−i+
2zi− yi) imply that equilibrium price can be characterized as follows in any SPE.
p = b(zi− yi)+ ri ∀i ∈ N (34)
In any SPE, ∂Πi∂zi = (p−bzi)∗
∂xi
∂zi − γi ≤ p−bzi− γi ≤ 0 holds true for ∂zi > 0. By yi = 0
and Eq. (34), it follows that ri ≤ γi < ci for all i ∈ N, and thus ∂x j(z,y)∂zi = 0 for all i, j ∈ N
by Lemma 2.2. Hence, any SPE has to satisfy
∂Πi
∂zi
= p−bzi− γi = 0 ∀i ∈ N. (35)
Since this condition is also sufficient, a profile z is part of an SPE iff it is a solution to
this equation system. The unique solution is zi = 1(n+1)b ∗
(
a+∑ j∈N γ j
)− γib for all i ∈ N.
Point 2. Fix any strategy profile (z,y,x). Initially assume that the capacities are
fully pre-built in stage 1 (along the path of play). Due to the assumption of sufficiently
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similar (γi), we can focus on the case that all capacities are positive, which implies that
the induced market price is above marginal costs γi for all i∈N. Let p denote the induced
market price. Hence, there exists a profile (λi) ∈ RN+ such that p−λibzi− γi = 0 for all
i ∈ N. Define k := #{ j ∈ N|λ j = 1}. First consider the case that (z,y,x) is an SPE. This
holds true only if λi ≤ 1 (for all i ∈ N), since i would otherwise benefit by increasing
zi unilaterally in stage 1 (note that no opponent responds to a small increase of zi by
decreasing quantity since p > γ j⇔ λ j > 0 for all j 6= i). Likewise, λi ≥ 1k+1 is necessary
(for all i ∈ N), since i would otherwise be best off cutting capacity zi unilaterally in
stage 1 (note that k players respond to i’s capacity cut by increasing quantity in stage 2).
Second we show that these necessary conditions are also sufficient. Assume (λi) satisfies
λi ∈
[ 1
k+1 ,1
]
for all i ∈ N for k = #{ j ∈ N|λ j = 1}. Note that this implies ∃i ∈ N : λi = 1,
i.e. k ≥ 1. No player may benefit from extending capacity unilaterally in stage 1 because
λi ≤ 1 for all i. Also, no player may benefit from cutting capacity since λi ≥ 1k+1 for all
i with λi < 1 and λi ≥ 1k for all i with λi = 1 (note that k and k−1 players, respectively,
respond to the capacity cut by extending quantity in stage 2).
It remains to show that the initial assumption—capacity be fully pre-built—can be
made without loss of generality. On the one hand, this holds true for proving sufficiency
of the conditions on (λi). For, p−λibzi− γi = 0 for all i implies (by Lemma 2.2) that
quantities equate with capacities in the unique stage 2 equilibrium. This confirms that
strategy profiles characterized by p−λibzi−γi = 0∀i∈N satisfy the initial assumption in
equilibrium, and hence that they are SPEs. Concerning the necessity of the restrictions on
(λi), on the other hand, first note that fully pre-building capacity is itself not a necessary
condition for SPE. It can be shown, however, that xi > zi for some i ∈ N can result in
equilibrium only if k as defined above satisfies k = 1, λi = 1, and for all j 6= i: λ j =
1
2 . Otherwise, some j 6= i would benefit by deviating unilaterally toward a higher z j in
stage 1. This case is compatible with the necessary conditions identified above, and in
all other cases, the initial assumption itself is necessary for SPE, and so must be the
derived conditions. Finally, it is easy to verify that p−λibzi− γi = 0∀i ∈ N induces the
equilibrium outcome described in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4.1 Fix a strategy profile (z,y,x) and let p denote the induced
market price. Assume that x(z,y) constitutes Nash equilibria for all (z,y). We focus on
SPEs where ri = ci for all i ∈ N results along the path of play (it will be shown that such
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SPEs exist, and it is easy to see that the set of outcomes of SPEs where ri 6= ci for at least
one i ∈ N is a subset of the outcomes derived in the following). To abbreviate notation of
directional derivatives, let ∇(∆zi,∆yi) f (z,y) denote the change of f (which could be xi, x j,
orΠi) if i changes (zi,yi) along (∆zi,∆yi). By Lemma 2.3, directions (∆zi,∆yi) that induce
∇(∆zi,∆yi)xi(z,y) 6= 0 are generally dominated. Given the stage 2 solutions xi(z,y) from
Eq. (26), it follows that we can focus on directions (∆zi,∆yi) such that either (i) ∆zi > 0
and ∆yi ≤ 2∆zi, or (ii) ∆zi < 0 and ∆yi ≤ n+1n ∆zi. It further holds that if a deviation in
any direction is profitable, then either of the extreme deviations where ∆yi is bound by
an equality must be profitable. Consider first ∆zi > 0 and ∆yi = 2∆zi. By Eq. (26), this
implies ∇(∆zi,∆yi)xi(z,y) = 0 and ∇(∆zi,∆yi)x j(z,y) = 0 for all j 6= i, and therefore
∇(∆zi,∆yi)Πi(z,y) = p−bzi− γi ≤ 0 (36)
has to be satisfied in equilibrium. Second consider ∆zi < 0 and ∆yi = n+1n ∆zi. By Eq.
(26), ∇(∆zi,∆yi)xi(z,y) = 0 and ∇(∆zi,∆yi)x j(z,y) =
1
n for all j 6= i result, which implies that
∇(∆zi,∆yi)Πi(z,y) =−
(
p− 1nbzi− γi
)≤ 0 (37)
has to be satisfied. In turn, all (z,y) that satisfy both conditions can be extended by ap-
propriate x to an SPE. Hence, the necessary and sufficient condition for SPE (conditional
on the initial assumption ri = ci for all i ∈ N) can be expressed as follows.
∀i ∈ N ∃λi ∈
[1
n ,1
]
: p−λibzi− γi = 0 (38)
Hence, bzi = λ−1i p−λ−1i γi for all i, and since p = a−b∑i zi in equilibrium, this implies
p =
(
a+∑iλ−1i γi
)
/
(
1+∑iλ−1i
)
. Since λibzi = p− γi, see Eq. (38), it follows that
λibzi =
1
1+∑ j λ−1j
(
a− γi+∑ j λ−1j (γ j− γi)
)
(39)
and that zi > 0 are positive for all i ∈ N and all (λi) ∈
[1
n ,1
]N
if the (γi) are sufficiently
similar. Finally, ri = p−b(zi− yi), see Eq. (34), and p = λibzi+ γi, see Eq. (38), imply
that the initial condition ri = ci is satisfied if byi = ci− γi+(1−λi)bzi. Since λi ∈
[1
n ,1
]
,
appropriate yi ≤ zi exist whenever ci is sufficiently close to γi. It is easy to see that these
(yi) do not contradict payoff maximization, since increasing yi implies ri > ci, decreasing
yi is payoff irrelevant, and directional variations of (zi,yi) are not profitable due to the
arguments made above.
24
Proof of Lemma 4.2 By a standard argument of upper hemicontinuity it follows that
the set of SPEs constructed for the case c ≈ γ in Prop. 4.1 remain SPEs when c = γ.
Hence, the set of equilibrium outcomes (prices and profits) in case c = γ contains all
equilibrium outcomes that may result if c ≈ γ (where c > γ). It also follows that all
outcomes that may result in SPEs in case c= γ but not in case c≈ γ necessitate xi > zi for
at least one i ∈ N along the path of play. It has to be shown that the outcomes associated
with such equilibria are in the set of equilibrium outcomes even if c ≈ γ. This follows
from an argument closely related to the proof of Prop. 3.2, i.e. it can be shown that all
SPEs where xi > zi for at least one i ∈ N along the path of play induce the Allaz-Vila
outcome (price and profits). The details are skipped.
Proof of Lemma 4.4 The proof is made by logical induction starting in round T . As-
suming x−T ∈ R denotes the aggregate quantity of the players acting in previous rounds,
the first-order condition for all i ∈ NT is Π′i = p− bxi− γi = 0, and hence the aggregate
quantity of all i ∈ NT is xaT = (a− bx−T − γi)/b ∗ |NT |/(1+ |NT |). Fix t ≤ T . Now as-
sume that the aggregate quantity of all players acting in rounds t ′ ≥ t can be expressed as
a function of the aggregate quantity x−t of the players acting in earlier rounds as follows.
xat =
βt
1+βt
· 1
b
(a−bx−t− γi) . (40)
Using βT = |NT |, this applies for t = T . The first-order condition for all i ∈ Nt−1 is
Π′i = p−
1
βt
·bxi− γi = 0, (41)
which allows us, in combination with Eq. (40) and p = a−b∑i xi, to express the price as
a function of x−(t−1) (the aggregate quantity prior to round t−1) as follows.
p− γi = 11+βt ∗ (|Nt−1|+1) · (a− γi−bx−(t−1)) (42)
Substituting this for p− γi in Eq. (41), again using Eq. (40), yields
xat−1 =
βt ∗ (|Nt−1|+1)
1+βt ∗ (|Nt−1|+1) ·
1
b
· (a− γi−bx−(t−1)). (43)
Hence, βt−1 = βt ∗ (|Nt−1|+ 1) = ∏Tt ′=t−1(|Nt ′ |+ 1), which thus applies for all t ≤ T .
For all t ≤ T and all i ∈ Nt , λi in Eq. (14) corresponds with β−1t+1 in Eq. (41), and thus
it confirms the first part of the lemma. The second part follows, since an equilibrium
corresponding with (λi) exists under the conditions of Prop. 4.1 if λi≥ 1n for all i∈N.
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Proof of Lemma 4.5 We show first that all payoff profiles Eq. (14) associated with
some (λi) ∈ [0,1]N where mini∈N λi < 1n are Pareto dominated by some (λ′i) ∈ [0,1]N
satisfying λ′i ≥ λi for all i ∈ N and λ′i > λi for at least one i ∈ N. Using r = 0, the payoff
of i ∈ N at (λi) can be expressed as, using hi(r) = (r+λ−1i )/λ−1i ,
Πi(r) =
1
λhi(r)i b
·
 a− γi
1+∑ j λ
−h j(r)
j
2 . (44)
The first derivative of Πi(r) with respect to r is proportional to
dΠi(r)
dr
∝−λi · lnλi+2 · ∑ j
lnλ j
1+∑ j λ−1j
(45)
and hence negative if λi = 1 (in this case, some j 6= i exists such that λ j < 1/n < 1).
Considering the case λi < 1, the aforementioned derivative of Πi is negative if
λi ·
(
1+∑ j λ−1j
)
< 2 ·∑
j
logλi λ j, (46)
which is generally satisfied if miniλi < 1n . As a result of dΠi/dr < 0 for all i ∈ N if
miniλi < 1n , for any (λi) ∈ [0,1]N where minλi < 1n there exists (λ′i) ∈
[1
n ,1
]N
such that
the payoff profile associated with (λi) is Pareto dominated by the one associated with
(λ′i). By Lemma 4.4 it thus follows that all outcomes of Stackelberg games are either in
the set of outcomes compatible with Prop. 4.1 or Pareto dominated by one of those.
Proof of Lemma 5.1 Fix T ≥ 1 and any MPE (z,y,x) of Γ(T ). Construct a strategy
profile (z′,y′,x′) of Γ(T + 1) as follows. (i) For all states (t,h) associated with some
t ≤ T maintain the strategies from Γ(T ), i.e. z′i(t,h) = zi(t,h) and y′i(t,h) = yi(t,h) for all
t ≤ T and h ∈ H. (ii) In the production period, set xi according to the unique equilibrium
x∗(h), for all h, derived in Lemma 2.2. (iii) For all states (t,h) associated with t = T +1,
set zi equal to the greater of zi(h) and xi(h), i.e. z′i(T +1,h) = max{zi(h),xi(h)}, and set
y′i(T +1,h) such that (for all i and h) p∗(h)−b(xi(h)−y′i(T +1,h))≤ γi where p∗(h) :=
a− b∑ j x j(h). Appropriate y′i(T + 1,h) ≥ yi(h) exist for all h since, by Lemma 2.2, the
xi(h) chosen in any SPE imply p∗(h)−b(xi(h)− yi(h))≤ ci = γi for all i.
Note that (z′,y′,x′) is outcome equivalent to (z,y,x). It remains to be shown that it
is an MPE of Γ(T + 1). By construction the latter is satisfied for the production period
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and also with respect to the y′i chosen in states (t,h) associated with round t = T +1 (they
are payoff irrelevant). By Lemma 2.2, the fact that (z,y,x) is an MPE of Γ(T ) implies
p∗− b(xi(h)− yi(h)) ∈ [0,γi] for all i and h, and this in turn implies that z′i(T + 1,h) =
max{zi(h),xi(h)} are mutual best responses in the states associated with period T + 1.
Finally, note that the construction of (z′,y′,x′) implies that for all states (t,h) with t = T
and all action profiles viable in this state, the profiles of continuation payoffs are identical
under (z′,y′,x′) and (z,y,x). Hence, action profiles that constitute mutual best responses
in state (T,h) of Γ(T ) must also be best responses in state (T,h) of Γ(T + 1), and by
backward induction, this applies in all states (t,h) with t ≤ T .
Proof of Proposition 5.2 Fix any T ∗ ≤ T . The following derives the conditions under
which a given outcome can result in an MPE of Γ(T ∗) subject to the constraint that the
quantity sold forward is increased in every planning period of Γ(T ∗). By Lemma 5.1,
an outcome equivalent MPE of Γ(T ) exists. Hence, the set of outcomes that can be
sustained in MPEs of Γ(T ) is the union of all outcomes as derived next over all T ∗ ≤ T .
Considering Γ(T ∗), fix any state (t,h) where t = T ∗. Similarly to the argument leading
to Eq. (38), it can be shown that the necessary and sufficient condition for MPE is (along
the equilibrium path, where zi(T ∗,h)> zi(h) can be assumed w.l.o.g.)
∀i ∈ N ∃λi ∈
[1
n ,1
]
: p∗(T ∗,h)−λib(zi(T ∗,h)− yi(h))− γi = 0, (47)
where p∗(T ∗,h) denotes the market price resulting along the equilibrium path conditional
on state (T ∗,h). Using p = a−b∑i zi it follows that
p∗(T ∗,h) =
1
1+∑iλ−1i
(
a+∑iλ−1i γi−b∑i yi(h)
)
(48)
Define βT ∗ := ∑iλ−1i . Thus, using γ= γ1 = · · ·= γn and y(h) = ∑i yi(h),
p∗(T ∗,h) =
(
a+βT
∗
γ−by(h)
)
/(1+βT
∗
). (49)
We now turn to states (t,h) in arbitrary rounds t ≤ T ∗. Define yT ∗i (t,h) as the quantity
that is going to be sold forward, prior to round T ∗ and conditional on the current state
(t,h), along the equilibrium path. The induction assumptions are (i) p∗(t,h) = (a+
βtγ− by(h))/(1+βt), which is satisfied for t = T ∗ using βT ∗ as defined above, and (ii)
yT
∗
i (t,h) = yi(h)+
p∗−γ
b ·αti, which is satisfied for t = T ∗ if αT
∗
i = 0 for all i ∈ N. By
definition, the profit of i in state (t,h) is Πi(t,h) = (z∗i − yi(h)) ∗ (p− γi) + p f ∗ yi(h),
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for some constant p f and using z∗i as the capacity that is going to be built eventually
conditional on (t,h). Eq. (47) allows us to express z∗i as a function of yT
∗
i (·), and the latter
can be expressed as yT
∗
i (t+1, ·) = yi(t,h)+ p
∗−γ
b ·αt+1i by the induction assumption. The
following expression of Πi follows, neglecting the constant term p f ∗ yi(h).
Πi(t,h) =
1
λib
(p∗− γ)2+
(
yi(t,h)+
p∗− γ
b
·αt+1i − yi(h)
)
· (p∗− γ) (50)
The first-order conditions of maximizing Πi(t,h) over yi(t,h) yield, for all i ∈ N,
yi(t,h) = yi(h)+
p∗− γ
b
·
[
1+βt+1−2(αt+1i +λ−1i )
]
. (51)
Hence, αti = α
t+1
i +
[
1+βt+1−2(αt+1i +λ−1i )
]
= 1+βt+1−αt+1i −2λ−1i , and
∑
i∈N
yi(t,h) = ∑
i∈N
yi(h)+
p∗− γ
b
·
[
n∗ (1+βt+1)−2∑i(αt+1i +λ−1i )
]
. (52)
Using the induction assumption (i) p∗(t+1,h) = (a+βt+1γ−b∑i yi(t,h))/(1+βt+1),
p∗(t,h) =
a−by(h)+ γ ·
[
n+(n+1)βt+1−2∑i(αt+1i +λ−1i )
]
(n+1)∗ (1+βt+1)−2∑i(αt+1i +λ−1i )
It follows that βt = n+(n+1)βt+1−2∑i(αt+1i +λ−1i ), and recursively both (αti) and βt
are thus well-defined for all t ≤ T ∗. Since yi(h) = 0 for all i ∈ N in t = 1 (no output is
sold forward prior to round 1), Eq. (48) thus yields the equilibrium price, Eq. (47) yields
the equilibrium capacity/quantity for all i ∈ N, and yT ∗i (1,h) = 0+ p
∗−γ
b ·α1i for all i ∈ N.
The equilibrium profit Eq. (22) follows from Eq. (50), using t = 1 and y1i = 0 for all i. To
see that βt is increasing in T ∗, resolve the recursive definition of βt . If T ∗− t is even,
βt = βt+1+n(βt+1−2βt+2+2βt+3−·· ·+ · · ·−2βT ∗−1)+2βT ∗ (53)
βt+1 = βt+2+n(βt+2−2βt+3+2βt+4−·· ·+ · · ·+2βT ∗+1)−2βT ∗ (54)
and (partially) substituting for βt+1, we obtain βt = βt+1+(n−1)(βt+1−βt+2) and the
expression provided in the proposition. The same applies if T ∗− t is odd. Note βT ∗−1−
βT ∗ = n+(n−2)βT ∗ and βT ∗ = ∑iλ−1i . Hence βt → ∞ as well as p→ γ when T ∗→ ∞.
Resolving the recursive definition of αti yields, for all i∈N, αti =∑T
∗
τ=t+1(1+βτ−2λ−1i )∗
(−1)T ∗−τ+1.
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